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Why does the UK have inconsistent preferences on financial regulation? The case of 
banking and capital markets 
 
Abstract 
 
What explains national preferences concerning international and regional financial 
regulation? This paper focuses on one of the main financial jurisdictions worldwide, the 
United Kingdom (UK). It is puzzling that since the crisis, this jurisdiction has pursued 
stringent harmonised regulation in certain areas (banking), but not others (capital markets). 
We explain this in terms of how the demands of powerful economic interests are mediated by 
the political process and regulatory institutions. In banking, there was strong political 
pressure to restore financial stability and regulatory institutions were significantly 
strengthened. This enabled UK regulators to resist industry lobbying and pursue more 
stringent harmonised rules at the international and European Union (EU) levels (‘trading 
up’). In the case of capital markets, by contrast, UK regulators lacked political support for 
tougher regulation and were institutionally much weaker. As a result, the industry was far 
more effective in shaping UK preferences aimed at protecting the sector’s competitiveness 
(‘trading down’). 
 
Introduction 
 
Since the international financial crisis, significant regulatory reforms have been enacted at the 
international, regional and national levels. This has spawned important new research 
examining the response of policy-makers through bank bail-outs (Culpepper and Reinke 
2014; Grossman and Woll 2013; Woll 2014) and regulatory changes (e.g. Moschella and 
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Tsingou 2013), especially in the main jurisdictions. Other works have analysed post-crisis 
international harmonisation in finance (e.g. Young 2012; Quaglia 2017). However, we know 
relatively little about how the financial crisis has changed (or not) national preferences 
towards international or regional (EU) financial regulation, and the political dynamics 
underpinning that process.  
 
This paper focuses on one of the main financial jurisdictions worldwide, the United Kingdom 
(UK). Prior to the crisis, it favoured a ‘light touch’ regulatory approach, which prioritized the 
competitiveness of the financial industry. These preferences have been explained with 
reference to the national variety of capitalism, which in the UK is predominantly based on 
finance (Fioretos 2011, 2010; Howarth and Quaglia 2016, 2013), the lobbying activities and 
the structural power of the financial industry (Bell and Hindmoor 2015; Culpepper and 
Reinke 2014), or the ‘market-making’ regulatory paradigm held by UK policy-makers 
(Mügge 2012; Busch 2004; Quaglia 2010). All these (different) theoretical explanations point 
in the same direction, which fitted well with the empirical record prior to 2007. However, 
since the crisis the UK has adopted inconsistent regulatory preferences, pursuing more 
stringent harmonised financial regulation for some financial services (banking), but not others 
(capital markets). This paper sets out to explain the shift in post-crisis UK financial 
regulatory preferences, and the strategy it has adopted at the international and regional 
(European Union (EU)) levels in pursuit of these.1 
 
Our aim is to better understand the process of national preference formation in financial 
regulation, drawing lessons applicable to other jurisdictions. The UK offers a valuable case 
study in several respects. First, UK preferences on financial regulation have changed 
significantly in several areas, confounding pre-crisis narratives about the UK as a champion 
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of light touch regulation. This provides an important opportunity to assess the causal 
mechanisms of regulatory preference change. Second, as host to one of the world’s leading 
international financial centres, the UK offers an important test case of how and why powerful 
domestic interests shape national preferences concerning international and EU regulation. 
Third, the UK has been at the forefront of regulatory reform efforts since the international 
financial crisis. Understanding the regulatory preferences and strategies of the UK is critical 
to understanding the changes to the international financial regulatory landscape over the past 
decade. Finally, our research is increasingly relevant in view of the UK’s decision to leave the 
EU. Unpacking the incentives and constraints faced by national policy-makers may provide 
valuable clues as to the UK’s position on financial regulation during the Brexit negotiations 
and beyond. 
 
The paper is organised as follows. We first review the literature on national preferences 
concerning international and EU financial regulation, and highlight their limited analytical 
leverage with reference to the UK post-crisis. We then outline our own theoretical 
framework, which draws on domestic theories of international regulation. This is assessed 
through a structured focused comparison of two cases of international and EU financial 
regulation: one case of banking regulation (capital requirements), and one case of capital 
market regulation (hedge funds). Our central argument is that the demands of powerful 
economic interests are mediated by the political process and regulatory institutions. In 
banking, there was strong political pressure to restore financial stability and regulatory 
institutions were significantly strengthened. This enabled UK regulators to resist industry 
lobbying and pursue more stringent harmonised rules at the international and EU levels 
(‘trading up’). In the case of capital markets, by contrast, UK regulators lacked political 
support for tougher regulation and were institutionally much weaker. As a result, the industry 
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was far more effective in shaping UK preferences aimed at protecting the sector’s 
competitiveness (‘trading down’). We conclude by reflecting on the wider significance of our 
argument. 
  
State of the art on national preferences and financial regulation 
 
National preferences on financial regulation have been explained using a variety of 
approaches, which we review here. In each case we highlight how existing explanations 
provide insufficient analytical leverage concerning the empirical puzzle outlined at the outset; 
namely, the UK’s post-crisis preferences on financial regulation.  
 
Comparative political economy offers important insights into regulatory developments in 
finance. These approaches emphasise the institutional configuration of national economic 
systems, such as the ‘varieties of capitalism’ and especially the ‘varieties of financial 
capitalism’ (Fioretos 2010, 2011; Howarth and Quaglia 2016, 2013). According to the 
explanation provided by this approach, the UK and the US oppose the tight regulation of 
hedge funds because these countries have a liberal market economy, a market-based financial 
system, and hosts a large number of hedge fund managers (Fioretos 2010). Similarly, the UK 
and the US support strict banking regulation because this does not penalise credit provision to 
the real economy in their jurisdictions. By contrast, continental countries, which have a bank-
based financial system where banks provide most of the credit to the real economy, resist 
strict banking regulation (Howarth and Quaglia 2016). However, these countries support 
strict regulation of hedge funds, which are hosted in a limited number in these jurisdiction 
(Fioretos 2010; Woll 2013).  
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Yet, comparative political economy approaches leave important blind spots concerning the 
explanation of national preferences on financial regulation because they tend to provide a 
‘static’ picture and overlook political dynamics. For example, US and UK regulators, despite 
the market-based financial systems in their jurisdictions, were the main promoters of the 
Basel II accord, which de facto lowered capital requirements for banks. However, these 
regulatory preferences were reversed post-crisis, during the negotiations of Basel III and the 
implementing EU legislation. Moreover, the position of UK’s and US’s regulators were 
fiercely opposed by their respective banking industry on competitiveness grounds (James 
2016). Shifting regulatory preferences and national industry’s opposition to the proposed 
rules do not sit well with accounts based national varieties of financial systems. Comparative 
approaches also provide little insight into why, at the height of the financial crisis, UK 
regulators pushed for much stricter regulation of hedge funds. More generally, these 
explanations tend to overlook the domestic political pressures faced by policy-makers which 
are frequently at odds with the demands of powerful economic interests. 
 
A second set of explanations examine the lobbying activities and the structural power of the 
financial industry, which result in ‘regulatory capture’ (Baker 2010).  Consequently, national 
preferences on international regulatory negotiations are shaped by interest groups that ‘have 
succeeded in becoming embedded in the relevant regulatory decision-making structure’ 
(Farrell and Newman 2010: 620), or are able to form powerful transnational alliances 
(Newman and Posner 2016). Some authors also pay attention to business-government 
relations and the capacity of interest groups to mobilise successfully. For example, Culpepper 
and Reinke (2014) argue that business must assert its structural power strategically, as in the 
case of the bank bail-outs in the UK and the US. Some studies also highlight the 
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heterogeneity of preferences and divisions amongst interest groups (Pagliari and Young 2014; 
Young 2012).  
 
Yet, business power explanations fit less well in the UK context. Paradoxically, the UK has 
continued to prioritise the competitiveness concerns of the hedge fund industry at the 
international and EU levels, even though the sector is highly fragmented and comparatively 
weakly organised (Woll 2013). By contrast, the UK banking industry, which is highly 
internationalised and enjoys extensive transnational linkages, has been unable to prevent the 
imposition of some of the highest capital and liquidity requirements in the world, despite its 
extensive lobbying capacity (Baker 2010; Young 2012) and the significant structural power 
wielded by the UK’s largest global banks (Bell and Hindmoor 2015). 
 
Partisan explanations would consider the effects of party preferences on financial regulation. 
The expectation is that left-wing parties pay more attention to financial stability and therefore 
demand more stringent regulation, whereas right-wing parties favour lax regulation as they 
are more sensitive to financial industry competitiveness (Way 2000; Westrup 2007). 
However, in the UK case, pre-crisis the two main parties on the left and right, namely Labour 
and Conservatives, privileged the competitiveness of the financial industry (Hopkin and 
Shaw 2016). Counter-intuitively, the tightening of post-crisis banking regulation took place 
under a Conservative-led government from 2010, and was supported by the opposition 
Labour party. Moreover, there was no discernible difference in the willingness of Labour and 
Conservative ministers to defend the interests of the hedge fund industry. Partisan accounts 
therefore provide limited explanatory power for post-crisis regulatory reform in the UK.  
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Finally, ideational and constructivist explanations posit that national preferences are shaped 
by causal ideas, or policy paradigms, held by policy-makers. For example, Quaglia (2010, 
2012) contrasts the ‘market-making’ versus ‘market-shaping’ approaches to financial 
regulation in the EU. Yet, this pre-crisis perspective needs updating to reflect the fact that, 
since the crisis, the UK has shifted from being a ‘market-maker’ to a ‘market-shaper’ in many 
areas of financial regulation. To this end, Bell and Hindmoor (2015, 2016) argue that 
regulatory preferences have shifted because of declining threat perceptions amongst policy-
makers and the enhanced capacity of the state, which has diminished the power of organized 
economic interests.  
 
Theory, research design and overall argument 
 
We set out to explain national preferences concerning the stringency of financial regulation: 
hence, whether the UK chooses to ‘trade up’ or ‘trade down’ rules, seeking international or 
EU rules that are more or less strict than existing rules. We define national preferences as the 
revealed policy positions of UK representatives in international and EU regulatory 
negotiations. International standards are ‘soft law’ that constrain all major jurisdictions, 
whereas EU regulation is ‘hard law’ that constrains only those in the EU, and indeed may 
disadvantage them with respect to external competitors. However, EU financial regulation is 
often based on international standards and is therefore used to make them legally binding 
across the EU.  
 
Our analytical framework starts with a traditional ‘dilemma’ in financial regulation, namely 
the need to safeguard financial stability as well as the competitiveness of the financial sector 
(Kapstein 1989). Stability and competitiveness are frequently in contradiction. Regulations 
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that promote high risk financial activities, for example, may increase competitiveness at the 
expense of long-term stability. Conversely, overly-stringent regulation can stifle innovation 
and place domestic industry at a competitive disadvantage. International and EU financial 
harmonisation can often provide a way to reconcile these competing incentives (Singer 2004, 
2007). By ‘trading up’ financial regulation through international or EU agreements, national 
authorities can implement more stringent regulation at home without putting domestic firms 
at a competitive disadvantage (Singer 2004: 543). Trading up can also contribute to 
addressing negative cross-border externalities that transmit financial instability across borders 
(Quaglia 2017). The nature of this trade-off is particularly acute with respect to financial 
regulation in the UK. In the wake of the financial crisis, for example, the UK government 
explicitly alluded to the ‘British dilemma’ between restoring the stability of the domestic 
banking system and protecting the international competitiveness of the City of London 
(Osborne 2010). 
 
The analysis draws on theories of liberal intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik 1993, 1998) to 
provide a critical reading of how regulatory preferences are formed at the national level. 
These are based on a liberal understanding of state–society relations, according to which 
societal ‘groups articulate preferences and governments aggregate them’ (Moravcsik 1993: 
482). It explains national preference formation by looking at the configuration of interests in 
a particular policy domain, and the institutions through which they are aggregated.  
 
With respect to interests, national regulators must remain attentive to the views of powerful 
economic interests as they provide important sources of political support, legitimacy, 
technical knowledge and expertise. These are valuable resources that regulators need in order 
to formulate their preferences, and which strengthen their capacity to shape financial 
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regulatory reforms in multi-level negotiations. The financial industry is a particularly 
powerful voice capable of mobilising vast resources for or against regulatory agreements 
based on the anticipated costs of regulatory change. In the UK context, the City of London 
has historically enjoyed close links to Westminster and Whitehall, giving it a prominent role 
in economic policy making (e.g. Baker 1999; Moran 1991). 
 
The next step is to consider how powerful economic interests are aggregated and mediated by 
institutions, which we define in terms of both the political process and regulatory institutions. 
During periods of economic stability, the political process rarely impinges on regulatory 
policy making as highly technical, day-to-day decisions are delegated to autonomous 
regulatory agencies. The influence of powerful economic interests is high as decisions are 
made in the realm of ‘quiet’ politics and informal modes of governance, and thus largely 
insulated from day-to-day political pressures (Culpepper 2011). In response to regulatory 
failures or economic crises, the influence of industry declines as decisions are escalated to 
more formal political decision-making arenas, such as ministerial or legislative committees, 
which face greater public exposure. In this context, the political process serves as a direct 
source of pressure on regulatory institutions to respond to voters’ concerns. 
 
Regulatory institutions relate to the policy making competences, resources and ideas that are 
embedded within regulatory organisations (Bell and Hindmoor 2016; Busch 2004). In 
financial regulation, regulatory agencies (central banks and independent financial regulators) 
are responsible for negotiating international standards in transnational networks, such as the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), the International Organization of 
Securities Commissions (IOSCO), and the Financial Stability Board (FSB). Commonly, these 
non-binding standards are then translated into hard EU legislation: at this level, national 
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finance ministers and finance ministry officials lead the negotiations in the Council working 
groups, supported by the relevant regulatory agency. Different institutions are equipped with 
varying levels of technical expertise and informational resources, and internalise different 
ideas about regulation. Institutions are therefore not neutral arenas for aggregating interests, 
but have considerable power to shape, resist or promote the interests of different groups. 
 
Our framework leads us to predict that when political pressure is high and regulatory 
institutions are strong, regulators are able to resist powerful economic interests and pursue 
more stringent regulation aimed at restoring financial stability. But when political pressures 
are absent and regulatory institutions are relatively weak, economic interests wield greater 
influence in shaping regulation designed to protect their competitiveness. The two cases we 
examine below illustrate this argument.  
  
Case study selection 
 
We assess the analytical leverage of this framework through a structured focused comparison 
and within case analysis of two case studies that provide contrasting examples of the UK’s 
post-crisis financial regulatory preferences at the international and EU levels. In the banking 
sector, UK regulators pushed strongly for the ‘trading up’ of regulation concerning bank 
capital requirements – namely, the Basel III international accord, and the EU Capital 
Requirements Directive IV (CRD IV). By contrast, the UK remained keen to ‘trade down’ 
regulation of capital markets – for example, with respect to the regulation of hedge funds 
through the principles issued by the International Organization of Securities Commissions 
(IOSCO), and the EU Alternative Investment Fund Managers directive (AIFMD).  
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Methodology and sources 
 
We engage in a structured comparative analysis of two cases, mapping and explaining the 
formation of UK preferences in each case. The empirical analysis draws on a variety of 
sources, including ten interviews with senior officials from the UK Treasury, the Bank of 
England and the Financial Services Authority, and ten interviews with senior representatives 
of UK-based trade associations and representatives of individual banks in London. The 
interviewees were selected on the basis of their institutional position and involvement in 
relevant financial regulation. All the interviews were conducted on a confidential basis. We 
also cross-checked the information gathered with publicly available policy documents and a 
systematic survey of press coverage. The article begins by summarizing the impact of the 
financial crisis on voter confidence in the financial industry, and explain how this elicited 
political pressure to restore financial stability and led to the reform of UK regulatory 
institutions. 
 
The international financial crisis and the reform of domestic regulatory institutions 
 
The financial crisis severely dented voter confidence in the financial services industry (see 
Bennett and Kottasz 2012). In surveys, 66% of the UK public thought there had not been 
enough reform of the financial sector (ComRes 2014), 73% rated the reputation of banks as 
‘bad’, and 60% supported the view that government should impose ‘tougher’ financial 
regulation (YouGov 2013). The fiscal burden of bailing out two of the UK’s largest banks 
(RBS and Lloyds) sent shockwaves through the political establishment. Addressing the 
concerns of the median voter (Downs 1957), the priority for both main UK parties was the 
restoration of financial stability and the protection of taxpayers. Government ministers 
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signaled clearly to bank regulators and industry that in the event of further bank failures, 
there would need to be a ‘serious downsizing’ of the City of London.2  
 
The financial crisis was followed by a reform of financial regulatory institutions in the UK. 
Prior to the crisis, under the ‘tripartite’ regulatory system put in place in 1997, responsibility 
for financial stability was shared between three institutions: the Bank of England, which 
managed monetary policy; the Financial Services Authority (FSA), a single supervisory 
agency for banking, insurance and securities; and the Treasury, the government department 
responsible for legislation. The institutional design of the FSA embodied a particular set of 
pre-crisis ideas about ‘light touch’ or ‘risk-based’ financial regulation (Westrup 2007). The 
FSA subscribed to the pre-crisis orthodoxy that financial stability rested on the soundness of 
individual institutions. This ‘microprudential’ approach reflected the view that greater 
transparency, disclosure and effective risk management by firms was necessary to regulate 
efficient markets, and that firms should abide by the spirit of high-level principles rather than 
the letter of detailed rules (Baker 2013).  
 
The FSA’s supervisory failings led to mounting parliamentary criticism of the tripartite 
system. In 2009, the Conservative opposition announced its intention to abolish the FSA and 
transfer the bulk of its regulatory and supervisory powers to the Bank of England, based on 
the recommendations of Sir James Sassoon (Conservative Party 2009: 14-16). Following the 
election of a Conservative-led Coalition government in May 2010, responsibility for 
microprudential supervision of individual banks was transferred from the FSA to the Bank, 
housed in the new Prudential Regulatory Authority (PRA), while responsibility for 
supervising all other financial firms, together with conduct regulation, was moved to the 
independent Financial Conduct Authority (FCA). These institutional reforms resulted in a 
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doubling of staff numbers in the Bank, with the headcount increasing from 1,769 in 2010 to 
3,948 in 2016 (Bank of England 2017). 
 
Since 2010, the Bank has been granted important new macroprudential powers and increased 
resources to execute its strengthened mandate for maintaining financial stability. These 
changes have been underpinned by a wider macroprudential ideational shift that emerged 
from the financial crisis (Baker 2013, Baker and Widmaier 2014; see also Borio 2011; 
Haldane 2013). The macroprudential perspective reverses many of the core assumptions of 
the efficient markets hypothesis, by highlighting the inherent procyclical tendencies of 
financial markets, the propensity for herd behaviour amongst investors, and the destabilising 
effects of financial complexity (Baker 2015: 351). It justifies new forms of regulatory 
intervention through the use of countercyclical policy measures to restrain and direct market 
activities on a system-wide basis (Haldane 2013). The centrepiece of these reforms in the UK 
was the creation of a powerful new Financial Policy Committee (FPC), chaired by the Bank 
Governor and supported by a new macroprudential strategy division (see Bell and Hindmoor 
2016). The FPC was given broad oversight of financial stability and systemic risk, and was 
granted a range of new macroprudential policy-making powers. These include the legal 
authority to set the countercyclical capital buffer introduced through Basel III; to set sectoral 
capital requirements; make ‘comply or explain’ recommendations to the PRA; and make 
recommendations to the Treasury on the setting of the boundary between regulated and non-
regulated financial activities (Tucker, Hall and Pattani 2013: 195). 
 
We argue that political pressure for tougher regulation of banks, combined with greatly 
strengthened domestic regulatory institutions, have curtailed the influence of powerful 
banking interests. The development of a new macroprudential regulatory paradigm has 
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enabled the Bank of England to serve as the intellectual driving force behind the UK’s push 
for more stringent international and EU banking regulation (Bell and Hindmoor 2016; James 
2016). By contrast, there has been no equivalent shift in the realm of capital market 
regulation where the legacy of microprudential supervision continues to prevail. Although the 
FSA attempted to challenge the pre-crisis orthodoxy by highlighting the need to include the 
shadow banking system in macroprudential regulation, it was weakened by a lack of political 
support and diminished institutional resources. Consequently, the hedge fund industry was 
highly effective in defining the UK’s regulatory preferences at the international and EU levels 
in defence of the sector’s competitiveness. Our argument is illustrated below with respect to 
bank capital requirements and hedge fund regulation. 
 
Banking regulation: trading up  
 
The UK’s regulatory preferences on capital requirements have undergone a dramatic change. 
This is underpinned by a recognition that the country is uniquely vulnerable to financial 
instability due to the concentrated and highly leveraged nature of its banking sector 
(Alessandri and Haldane 2009). It also reflects the belief amongst leading UK regulators that 
capital ratios should be set far above the losses likely to be incurred by the failure of an 
individual bank, in order to protect the macro systemic stability of credit supply (Miles et al. 
2011; Turner 2011). Armed with new countercyclical policy tools, the PRA therefore forced 
UK-based banks to deleverage by raising capital requirements ‘ten-fold’ (Carney 2015), 
through the use of higher equity capital requirements, tougher liquidity rules, and by 
introducing a new gross leverage ratio (King 2010). The FPC has strictly enforced these new 
rules, using stringent stress tests and scrutinising bank risk-weights to assess the adequacy of 
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capital buffers. This culminated in a regulatory regime for banking which is amongst the 
toughest in the world (Bell and Hindmoor 2016).  
 
Given the scale of the UK financial services sector, the extent to which bank capital 
requirements needed to be tightened to restore financial stability risked damaging the sector’s 
competitiveness. This was vocalised by the UK’s largest global banks (HSBC, Barclays and 
Standard Chartered), all of whom threatened to relocate overseas in response to the UK’s 
deteriorating regulatory outlook (James 2017). In response, UK regulators actively pursued a 
strategy of trading up, seeking international and EU level regulatory harmonisation around 
more stringent standards to minimise the potential competitive disadvantage to UK banks.  
 
Internationally, the Bank of England and the FSA allied with US and Swiss counterparts, 
adopting ‘trench warfare’ to push for a stricter definition of capital, higher capital 
requirements, new liquidity rules, and the introduction of a leverage ratio.3 The intellectual 
driving forces during the Basel negotiations were the US Federal Reserve and the Bank of 
England/FSA, not least because they occupied a disproportionate share of the chairmanships 
of key sub-committees. Indeed, the FSA co-chaired the BCBS Working Group on the 
Definition of Capital, while the Bank of England and Federal Reserve co-chaired the BCBS 
Working Group on Liquidity. The UK achieved most of its objectives in the Basel III accord, 
which included significantly higher equity capital requirements, agreed in December 2010.  
 
As the debate shifted to the EU level, the Bank of England was determined to ensure that the 
rules were implemented in full. Worryingly, however, the European Commission’s draft 
proposal for implementing Basel III, through the CRD IV, threatened the Bank’s objectives in 
two respects. First, the CRD IV was significantly less stringent than Basel III. At the 
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insistence of France and Germany, capital definitions were to be diluted to allow state support 
(‘silent participations’) and insurance subsidiaries (‘double counting’) to be excluded in the 
calculation of regulatory capital. Second, the Commission’s insistence on ‘maximum 
harmonisation’ would prevent the FPC from imposing higher capital requirements on UK 
retail banks than international or EU standards, rendering the new body ‘completely 
toothless’.4  
 
The Bank of England’s position was at odds with the UK-based financial industry, and 
strained relations with the Treasury. The British Bankers Association (BBA) initially opposed 
Basel III on the grounds that this would hit profitability, damage lending to the real economy, 
and place UK banks at a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis the US and China (Financial 
Times, ‘Basel rewrites capital rules for banks’, 12 September 2011). During the negotiations, 
for example, the BBA and six large UK banks commissioned the professional services firm, 
PwC, to produce a report compiling the likely impact of the Basel rules on the supply of 
credit in the economy. Yet, the initiative, known as Project Oak, was regarded as ‘futile and 
inaccurate’ and largely ignored by UK regulators.5 At the EU level, industry’s fallback 
position was to lobby strongly in favour of maximum harmonisation to create a level playing 
field in the EU.6 UK-based banks deliberately distanced themselves from the views of UK 
negotiators and instead sought to build support amongst finance ministries and regulators in 
other EU member states. 
 
The Treasury was not viewed as having a strongly-held view on bank capital requirements, or 
banking reform more generally, because it was ‘seriously inadequate in terms of resources 
and basic understanding’.7 As a result, they were ‘very keen to understand from all the banks 
involved what the impact of these rules would be. It was quite considerable in terms of 
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volume and quality of information throughout.’8 A regulator suggested that this lack of 
expertise meant that the Treasury was considerably more willing to engage with industry than 
the Bank of England: ‘Certainly what I’ve seen is that the Treasury goes to the banks and 
says “well how does this work, can you teach us how this works?”…So the banks can push 
certain arguments in the Treasury that we [the Bank] would slap down very quickly.’9 
 
As a result, the Treasury’s preferences are generally perceived to be much closer to that of 
industry. Although broadly supportive of the Bank’s determination to strengthen bank capital, 
Treasury officials expressed mounting concern about the pace and severity of deleveraging 
and its impact on the UK economy. For example, one official was critical of ‘jihadist’ 
elements in the Bank for forcing banks to comply with leverage ratio early, while Vince 
Cable referred to the capital ‘Taliban’ for damaging lending (Financial Times ‘Vince Cable 
attacks Bank of England’s “capital Taliban”’, 23 July 2013). On CRD IV, the Treasury 
wanted to avoid damaging the competitiveness of the City of London and was therefore more 
sympathetic to the principle of maximum harmonisation on the grounds that this would create 
a level playing field.10  
 
Industry lobbyists tried to exploit these institutional divisions by lobbying the Treasury and 
No.10 against the Bank’s hardline position. Senior lobbyists confirmed that while lobbyists 
found the Bank of England to be largely impervious to industry pressure, the banks sought to 
exploit ‘regular contacts and existing relationships’ with the Treasury and were given 
‘remarkable access’ to ministers by No.10.11 In a sign of how strained relations had become, 
the Bank Governor publicly denounced industry’s attempts to influence ministers, while 
Robert Jenkins, a member of the FPC, claimed that industry lobbying tactics were 
intellectually dishonest (Jenkins 2011). 
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The Bank was pivotal in defining the UK’s negotiating position on CRD IV. Prior to the crisis 
it had tended to leave EU matters to the FSA, but the centralisation of financial supervision in 
the Bank transformed its role and strengthened its capabilities.12 It sought to defend the UK’s 
achievements in strengthening international capital rules, forced UK banks to comply years 
ahead of schedule, and championed the capacity of UK regulators to gold plate global 
standards to reflect the size of its financial sector. In response, leading UK regulators made a 
series of public interventions aimed at keeping the Treasury’s ‘feet to the fire’.13 As the 
debate shifted to Brussels in 2011, the FPC issued interim recommendations urging the 
government to defend regulators’ flexibility, while Mervyn King told Parliament that Basel 
III did not go far enough and cited the support of the IMF, ECB and ESRB for its position 
(Financial Times, ‘IMF supports UK push on bank rules’, 6 June 2011).  
 
The Bank also galvanized wider political support based on the recommendations of the 
Independent Commission on Banking (ICB), which called for UK retail banks to hold equity 
capital significantly above Basel III rules to reduce the risk of future state support (ICB 
2011). A series of bank scandals, culminating with the establishment of the Parliamentary 
Commission on Banking Standards in 2012, maintained further political pressure on the 
Treasury to resist fierce industry lobbying. In this way, the Bank constrained the position of 
Treasury negotiators by publicly denouncing maximum harmonisation and making opposition 
to it a red line issue. In the end, Treasury officials ‘held the line’ and the EU eventually 
agreed to a series of legal derogations in the CRD IV which provided UK regulators with the 
discretionary powers they sought (James 2016). 
 
Capital market regulation: trading down 
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During the crisis, starkly divergent views emerged within the UK about how capital markets 
should be regulated. The senior leadership of the FSA underwent a rapid process of learning 
and lesson-drawing from the crisis which, as in the Bank of England, led to a profound 
ideational shift on financial regulation. As a result, the FSA became a strong supporter of 
more stringent regulation in 2008 and its head, Lord Adair Turner, was one of the ‘most 
forceful and eloquent advocates’ of the macroprudential approach (Baker 2013: 125). In 
March 2009, Turner published his review of financial regulation. It argued that one of the 
crucial factors in the origins of the crisis was regulatory arbitrage arising from the 
development of ‘shadow’ financial institutions that performed bank-like functions, but which 
were not regulated as banks (FSA 2009: 72). It argued that hedge funds had now become 
‘systemically important’ and that macroprudential regulation, including stricter capital and 
liquidity rules, should in future be extended to all investment intermediaries that become 
‘bank-like in nature or systemic in importance’ (FSA 2009: 73). The FSA therefore pushed 
for the adoption of a tough new macroprudential approach to regulating the hedge fund sector 
at the G20 and the Financial Stability Forum, and made the case forcibly to the Treasury, 
Bank of England and Cabinet Office.14 
 
However, the political authorities in the UK, unlike for example those in France and 
Germany (Fioretos 2010; Pagliari 2011; Woll 2013), remained reluctant to tighten up 
regulation of capital markets. A joint document produced by the Treasury and the FSA (2009: 
2), under the leadership of the Treasury, articulated the view of industry representatives that 
‘hedge fund activity (either in Europe or elsewhere) has not been shown to have contributed 
significantly to the crisis’. The document also pointed out that ‘the individual risks they 
[hedge funds] pose are not unique’ and therefore legislation aimed at hedge funds alone 
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would be unwarranted. The Treasury’s view was supported by the publication of several 
official reports (for example, the report of the de Larosiere Group in the EU, and the report of 
the Group of Thirty) which did not explicitly identify hedge funds as major culprits of the 
crisis.  
 
In line with our explanation, the position of the Treasury can be ascribed to the fact that it 
faced little political pressure from ministers to crack down on the hedge fund industry. 
Instead, Treasury officials remained firmly wedded to their long-held commitment of 
defending the competitiveness of the predominantly UK-based sector. While the FSA sought 
to extend tougher macroprudential regulation to capital markets, its capacity to push back 
against the Treasury’s pre-crisis orthodoxy during 2009-10 was however severely limited by 
the fact that it was engaged in a bureaucratic fight for survival. We argue below that in the 
absence of political pressure for reform, together with institutional weakness on the part of 
regulators, industry was therefore highly effective in shaping the UK’s regulatory preferences 
at the international and EU levels. 
 
New regulatory initiatives to curb the activities of hedge funds developed rapidly during 
2009. At the G20 London summit in April 2009, political leaders called for the direct 
regulation of hedge funds for the first time, recommending greater disclosure of information 
about fund investments to enable regulators to assess their systemic risk (G20 2009). The 
European Commission responded swiftly by announcing that it planned to introduce a 
harmonised regulatory framework for AIFM (European Commission 2009: 5). Under 
pressure from France, Germany and the European Parliament, the Commission hastily 
produced a draft directive in June 2009 which imposed a number of stringent requirements. 
These would require the AIFM to register and seek authorisation with national authorities, 
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and meet new reporting, governance and risk management standards, including minimum 
capital requirements.  
 
From industry’s perspective, AIFMD would be highly damaging to the competitiveness of the 
EU hedge fund industry, 85% of which was based in the UK (TheCityUK 2012). The draft 
directive was viewed not simply as a politically-motivated attack on ‘Anglo-American’ 
capitalism, but as a deliberate attempt to support the European mutual fund industry, 
predominantly based in France (23%) and Germany (20%) (Woll 2013). Industry was 
particularly concerned about the imposition of prescriptive third country equivalence rules 
that threatened to harm the City of London by locking overseas firms out of lucrative EU 
markets (Quaglia 2011). In response, the hitherto highly fragmented and weakly organized 
sector launched a concerted lobbying campaign of UK ministers and regulators. 
 
Because of the public backlash against the financial industry, government ministers were 
hesitant to appear too supportive of the sector in public. Yet, public awareness and knowledge 
about the industry was comparatively limited (Treasury Committee 2006: 156). Unlike, for 
example, in France and Germany (Pagliari 2013; Woll 2014), where the regulation of hedge 
funds attracted strong political intervention, in the UK ministers saw little electoral advantage 
in attacking the industry and their own understanding of the role of hedge funds in 
contributing to the crisis was relatively limited. In private the government was therefore 
‘quite sympathetic’ to industry’s concerns and ‘promised to do all they could to help’.15 
Industry executives were given ‘very good access’ to senior ministers in both the Labour and 
Conservative governments, and they provided ‘good political support all the way through the 
process’ because they recognised that the sector was important for employment and tax 
revenue.16  
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Although City Minister Lord Myners had been highly critical of hedge funds in the past, by 
mid-2009 he was echoing the concerns of industry that the directive was ‘woefully short-
sighted’ and ‘bordering on a weak form of protectionism’ (Financial Times, ‘UK knocks EU 
fund proposal’, 7 July 2009). Following the election, Chancellor George Osborne signalled 
that the sector’s competitiveness should be protected, while the House of Lords EU 
Committee called on the government to refuse to support AIFMD (House of Lords 2010). 
Unlike banking, there was therefore a notable lack of political support for more stringent 
regulation of capital markets.  
 
UK regulators had failed to anticipate the EU proposal and were initially slow to respond; as 
in banking, this was attributed to them being severely under-resourced. The Treasury had 
limited resources in the hedge fund sector because it had not been a significant ‘political 
issue’ prior to the crisis, while the FSA policy team lacked ‘practical expertise’.17 In addition, 
the FSA was fatally weakened at this time by mounting speculation that it would be 
abolished, exacerbated by the Conservatives’ strong performance in the 2009 European 
Parliament elections. According to industry figures, the FSA underwent a ‘collective nervous 
breakdown’ as its top talent left the institution, and it became a ‘real non-actor’ after the 2010 
election.18 
 
Consequently, both institutions were heavily reliant on the advice and support of industry 
lobbyists in formulating the UK’s negotiating position.19 A close relationship with industry 
subsequently developed, managed through a series of working groups in the Treasury and the 
FSA which were used to find out industry’s priorities, gather technical advice, and to agree 
negotiating positions.20 The Treasury had no strong pre-existing view: ‘They had no clear 
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position. They just wanted to try and make the directive workable. I didn’t see any particular 
strategy, they were just reacting.’21 Under pressure from ministers, Treasury officials assured 
senior executives that they would fight for changes to be made, and engaged closely with 
industry ‘to work out what it thought, on the hoof’.22  
 
With fate of the FSA sealed by the outcome of the 2010 general election, financial regulators 
struggled to provide a clear strategy: ‘The FSA didn’t give me any objectives. The message 
was just to make it technically workable. That was achieved by setting up these technical 
working groups, listening to industry, and running policy by them.’23 Regulators openly 
acknowledged that it was ‘very easy to buy into the technical advice that you’re given by the 
industry’, and that ‘they probably didn’t realise how influential they were on me.’24 Under 
time pressures and lacking resources, UK negotiators in Brussels often relied on lobby groups 
to provide suggested text which could be used when drafting rules.25 As a lobbyist argued, 
‘we didn’t have any problem getting them to take our red lines to Brussels’.26 Equally, UK 
negotiators helped industry groups, which had little knowledge or experience of the EU 
policy process, to play a constructive role by engaging with the European Parliament and 
targeting key MEPs.27 
 
In the absence of political support for tougher regulation, and under heavy industry pressure 
to defend the sector’s competitiveness, UK regulators sought to ‘really go after’ the content 
of proposed new international and EU rules.28 The two-chairs of the IOSCO working group 
that drafted in 2009 the Key Principles for Hedge Fund Regulation 2009 came from the 
British FSA and the Italian Consob, and espoused respectively a ‘minimalist’ and a 
‘maximalist’ approach to the regulation of hedge funds. The minimalists, led by the FSA, 
were in favour of indirect regulation of hedge funds and argued that only the hedge fund 
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manager should be regulated. The maximalists, led by continental regulators, argued that the 
hedge fund itself should be regulated.29 In the end, the IOSCO recommendations which 
emerged were deliberately ambiguous on this issue, which suited the UK’s interests. 
 
In the EU negotiations that followed in 2010, UK regulators repeatedly blocked the 
legislative proposal for AIFMD, resulting in deadlock in the Council. With German support 
waning, and under the threat of retaliation from the US, the French eventually agreed to back 
down by amending the more contentious provisions. In July 2010, the FSA brokered a 
compromise which resolved the third country issue by relaxing the new rules for regulatory 
equivalence and delaying implementation to 2018. In response to the revisions, industry 
signalled that the outcome was something that it could ‘live with’. Having failed to resist EU-
level harmonisation on competitiveness grounds, UK regulators nonetheless succeeded in 
watering down the directive in line with industry demands. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper started with an empirical puzzle concerning the UK’s inconsistent preferences on 
post-crisis international and EU financial regulation. We argue that when political pressures 
are high and regulatory institutions are strong, regulators are able to resist powerful economic 
interests and pursue more stringent regulation aimed at restoring financial stability (as in the 
case of bank capital requirements). But when political pressures are absent and regulatory 
institutions are relatively weak, economic interests wield greater influence in shaping 
regulation designed to protect their competitiveness (as in the regulation of hedge funds).  
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The paper contributes to the broader literature on lobbying and business power by specifying 
the conditional nature of the financial industry’s influence. In the case of capital markets, UK 
regulators prioritised competitiveness issues and the trading down of international and EU 
rules. This is because political pressures for regulatory reform at home was low, and domestic 
regulatory institutions lacked the capabilities to resist powerful economic interests. In the 
case of hedge funds, regulators therefore had little choice but to forge a close alliance with 
industry to leverage its expertise during the international and EU negotiations. In banking 
regulation, by contrast, regulators were under high political pressure to avoid further bank 
failures and restore financial stability. Regulatory institutions had been significantly 
strengthened in terms of both policy making powers and resources, underpinned by new 
macroprudential regulatory ideas. This enabled regulators to shun industry lobbying efforts, 
pursue harmonisation around more stringent bank capital requirements, and even push for 
discretionary powers to permit rules above and beyond international and EU standards. 
 
Although beyond the scope of this article, we conclude by reflecting briefly on what our 
framework would predict for ‘mixed’ cases: that is, cases of strong political pressure/weak 
regulatory institutions and weak political pressure/strong regulatory institutions. If political 
pressure is strong and regulatory institutions are weak, we expect that elected officials would 
establish new or ad hoc institutional structures to overcome the limited capacity of existing 
regulatory institutions. These new structures would be designed to accumulate knowledge 
and expertise around a specific regulatory issue, and to develop regulatory reform proposals. 
An illustration of this would be the UK’s banking reform process. In the absence of expertise 
on bank ‘structural’ reform amongst regulators, and in response to political pressure for high 
street banks to be broken up, the government responded by establishing an Independent 
Commission on Banking in July 2010 to gather evidence and make policy recommendations. 
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While this ad hoc institution proved highly effective in resisting industry lobbying, the 
disbanding of the ICB in 2011 paved the way for large banks to exert greater influence over 
the Treasury. This resulted in the final legislation being significantly weaker than originally 
intended (James 2017). The framework would also lead us to expect that, in relying on ad hoc 
institutional structures to develop regulatory proposals, the scope for international 
harmonisation is likely to be much less. This was indeed the case with bank structural reform, 
whereby the UK has made little effort to define or shape international or EU-level standards 
(Quaglia and Spendzharova 2017).  
 
By contrast, in cases where political pressure is weak and regulatory institutions are strong, 
we are more likely to see regulators acting autonomously to tighten regulation domestically, 
while playing an active role in trading up international and EU-level standards. For example, 
elected officials in the UK paid relatively little attention to the regulation of over-the-counter 
derivatives (OTCD) following the crisis. Yet it was regarded as an important priority for 
regulators in the Bank of England to which responsibility was transferred for the oversight of 
Central Counter Parties. In response, the Bank was an international pace-setter in defining 
new standards issued by the International Organization of Securities Commission (IOSCO) 
and the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS) (Quaglia 2014). Unlike bank 
structural reform, however, regulators were in a much stronger position to resist industry 
lobbying. In short, while both ‘mixed’ cases produced more stringent rules, regulatory reform 
proved to be more robust in the face of industry pressure when regulatory institutions were 
strong. 
 
Our analysis has added significance in light of the UK’s decision to withdraw from the EU. 
Fundamentally, the paper challenges pre-crisis narratives about the UK as a champion of 
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financial deregulation, often caricatured as battling to resist the imposition of external (often 
EU) regulatory burdens on the City of London. On the contrary, we show that UK regulators 
have often pursued increasingly stringent international and EU standards at odds with the 
views of the banking industry. This is because standardised rules enable UK regulators to 
achieve domestic policy objectives, like restoring stability or boosting competitiveness. This 
remains important in the context of Brexit. In his evidence to the Treasury Select committee 
at the House of Commons, the governor of the Bank of England Mark Carney (2017) stated 
that post-Brexit ‘We do not want to be a rule-taker as an authority. Right now, we are not a 
rule-taker; we come to a consensus within the EU…the rules in the EU are influenced by 
international standards and by the presence of UK officials in their development. Once we are 
not there, one would expect increasingly rules with which we do not agree’ (emphasis added). 
Post-Brexit, UK regulators are therefore likely to try to increasingly influence international 
standards to compensate for their loss of influence on EU regulation.  
 
We anticipate that Brexit will reinforce the tendency of the UK to adopt inconsistent 
preferences on financial regulation. In banking, UK regulators are likely to maintain strict 
banking regulation as they prioritise domestic financial stability, in line with their 
strengthened post-crisis mandate. In his main speech after the UK government invoked article 
50 to start the withdrawal from the EU, Bank of England Governor Mark Carney (2017b) 
argued that hosting the world’s leading international financial sector ‘requires the highest 
standards of supervision and regulation’. Carney signalled that there should be ‘no bonfire of 
regulation’ as a result of Brexit, and that UK regulators would push for ‘enhanced 
equivalence’, ‘mutual recognition’ and ‘intensive supervisory cooperation’ at the European 
and international levels (Carney 2017a, b). Similarly, the head of the FCA, Andrew Bailey, 
stated that in recognition of the UK’s role in underpinning financial markets as an 
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international public good, ‘we do not intend to create a race-to-the-bottom on deregulation’ 
and that they ‘continue to be prepared to go further’ in regulating financial markets than other 
jurisdictions (Bailey 2017).  
 
From the perspective of industry, there is little appetite for deregulation in banking. Rather, 
the ‘overwhelming majority’ of financial firms support maintaining ‘regulatory coherence 
with Europe’ in order to maximise access to the EU single market, as suggested in several 
confidential interviews.30 The Great Repeal Bill is therefore not viewed as a vehicle for 
regulatory change, but instead as an opportunity to ‘ensure clarity and continuity wherever 
possible’.31 Moreover, many expect UK regulators to continue, and even possibly extend, the 
existing practice of ‘goldplating’ EU legislation, such as on bank capital, so that UK rules are 
significantly tougher. By contrast, there is greater scope and industry pressure for the UK to 
pursue less stringent regulation in other financial sectors after Brexit. For example, evidence 
suggests that insurance firms are ‘pushing hard’ for post-Brexit changes to reduce the 
regulatory burden of EU legislation, particularly the new Solvency II directive (MS).32 We 
would anticipate similar calls from the hedge fund sector, particularly from those firms and 
individuals that were prominent sponsors of the Leave campaign during the referendum, 
many of whom view Brexit as an opportunity for ‘regulatory roll back’.33 In short, we 
conclude that the impact of Brexit is likely to make the regulatory challenge of managing the 
British dilemma in finance more, not less, acute. 
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